

Toolkit
Area-based Initiatives

Local Hiring Requirements

What are they and what do they aim to do?

Area-based initiatives (ABIs) are policy initiatives aimed at improving growth in specific, tightly defined geographic areas. This toolkit focuses on ABIs that support businesses, such as the Employment Zone and Empowerment Zone designs commonly used in the UK, US, France and other countries, rather than ABIs that target disadvantaged individuals directly. It considers the extent to which such business-focussed ABIs generate additional employment for local residents and assesses whether explicit local hiring requirements affect the extent of local hiring.

If residents living in deprived areas have low access to employment opportunities due to a lack of jobs in the area, discrimination, or mobility restrictions, for example, then ABIs may try to break down these barriers by bringing new employment opportunities to the areas. This relies on the ABI creating jobs and those jobs being new to the wider area. That is, jobs that are not displaced from other nearby areas – a major concern for ABIs, considered in detail in our [evidence review](#). Assuming new jobs are created, then some of these must go to local residents if they are to see labour market benefits. ABIs can impose local hiring requirements to try to increase the proportion of jobs that go to local residents.

This toolkit considers whether these local hiring requirements affect the likelihood that the ABI creates jobs, and that these go to local residents. Based on the available evidence we aren't able to consider whether such requirements change the likelihood or extent of displacement.

Price effects – either in terms of wages or house prices – may reinforce or offset any labour market benefits. We also briefly consider these effects in this toolkit.

Box 1: Examples of local hiring requirements

The aim of adding a local hiring requirement is to create economic incentives to encourage firms to hire local residents. For instance, Empowerment Zones in the US provide wage credits (up to 20% for the first \$15,000 earned) for each employee living in designated areas. Similarly, US Renewal Community zones provide wages credits of \$1,500 per employee living and working in the targeted community. Finally, in French Zone Franches Urbaines (ZFU), ZFU firms are offered exemption from payroll tax conditional on a proportion of their employees (33%) living in the intervention area.

Things to consider

- **Will the imposition of local hiring requirements hinder overall job creation in the ABI?** The evidence suggests not. If anything, schemes with local hiring requirements are slightly more likely to create jobs in the ABI.
- **Will the imposition of local hiring requirements increase job creation for local residents?** Despite the finding on overall job creation, the evidence suggests not. Schemes without local hiring requirements are just as likely to create jobs for local residents.
- **How stringent do local hiring requirements need to be to change firm behaviour?** The finding that local hiring requirements don't negatively affect overall job creation, but don't positively affect job creation for local residents is surprising. One possible explanation is that the local hiring requirements are not strong enough to influence either decision. This might be because constraints imposed aren't binding (i.e. the firm would have employed local people anyway) or because incentives offered are too weak. More stringent local hiring requirements might have a bigger effect on local hiring but might also reduce job creation in the ABI. Another possibility is that residents face other barriers to work - e.g. in terms of skills - that mean that local employment opportunities are not the only issue that needs to be addressed.
- **Will local hiring requirements have any other effects?** ABIs with local hiring requirements are more likely to be associated with increases in local wages. But they are also more likely to lead to house price increases, perhaps because local jobs generate amenity benefits – e.g. fewer vacant buildings – even if these jobs don't go to local residents. These wage and house price effects mean that the distributional effects will be complicated. For example, higher wage effects may come from increased displacement of existing residents. The overall effects will also depend on whether a local resident is a home-owner or a renter.

What are the effects of local hiring requirements?

We found 39 studies that look at employment effects of business-focussed ABIs. These studies provide 55 estimates of the effect on employment at firms in targeted areas or on employment of local residents (or both), 12 estimates of wage effects and 6 estimates of house price effects. Not all these studies cover ABIs with local hiring requirements and comparisons of schemes with and without requirements are the main basis on which we reach conclusions about effectiveness.

- **ABIs can increase the number of jobs in designated areas, but effects are not always positive.** About 55% of the 24 work-based employment estimates are positive meaning that schemes bring jobs to targeted areas. Some of these jobs may be displaced from surrounding areas.
- **Local hiring requirements do not seem to negatively affect the likelihood that an ABI will bring jobs to targeted areas.** In fact, for schemes with a local hiring requirement, 75% of work-based employment estimates are positive in contrast to only 33% for schemes without a requirement.
- **ABIs can increase the number of local residents in employment, but effects are not always positive.** A little under 55% of 24 residence-based estimates are positive meaning that schemes bring jobs to people that live in targeted areas. However, local hiring requirements do not seem to affect the likelihood that a business-focussed ABI will bring jobs to people that live in targeted areas.
- **The evidence is mixed on whether ABIs improve the employment outcomes of existing residents.** A small number of studies directly consider employment outcomes for existing residents. Most of these studies consider schemes that involve local hiring requirements. Two out of five of these studies report a positive effect on employment outcomes for residents.
- **ABIs with local hiring requirements are slightly more likely to generate positive wage effects.** Only one of four studies report a positive effect on wages for ABIs with no local hiring requirement, in contrast to four out of eight for ABIs with a local hiring requirement.
- **ABIs with local hiring requirements are slightly more likely to generate positive house price effects.** The four studies that consider the impact of ABIs with local hiring requirements all report positive house price effects. In contrast, neither of the two studies that looked at schemes without local hiring requirements reported positive effects.

Are ABIs for local hiring cost-effective?

Unfortunately, the papers do not provide enough evidence to allow us to assess whether imposing local hiring requirements is a cost-effective way of increasing local hiring.

Annex 1: Evidence of local hiring in ABIs

How secure is the evidence?

This toolkit summarises the available empirical evidence on the effect of ABIs on local employment, wages and house prices, with a specific focus on the effect of local hiring requirements on these outcomes. This toolkit does not consider evidence based on qualitative or case study methods but focuses instead on econometric evaluations that identify the causal effect of the support provided. We consider evidence on ABIs that support businesses, rather than ABIs that target disadvantaged individuals directly. We aim to cover evidence from OECD countries, in English.

We considered any study that provided before-and-after or cross-sectional evidence that controls for differences between areas receiving and not receiving support. We also included more robust studies that compared changes to areas receiving support with a control group or studies that exploit discontinuities in eligibility rules to estimate a causal effect on residents or communities. We place greater emphasis on studies with stronger and more robust econometric methods.

There are 46 studies that look at one or more of our outcomes of interest. 14 of these are SMS4, 23 SMS3, and nine SMS2. 32 studies are from the US, 8 from France, and 5 from the UK. One study compares US EZs with the European Regional Development Funds. Not all studies cover ABIs with local hiring requirements and comparisons of schemes with and without requirements are the main basis on which we reach conclusions about effectiveness. We found eight studies that looked specifically at the impact of ABIs with local hiring requirements on local hiring. The annex provides a brief description of these studies.

The evidence

The comparisons on which we based our findings are summarised in Table 1 to Table 5.

ABIs can increase the number of jobs in designated areas, but effects are not always positive. Local hiring requirements do not seem to negatively affect the likelihood that a business-focussed ABI will bring jobs to targeted areas.

Table 1 looks at estimates of the effect on work-based employment. Work-based employment refers to the number of jobs created in the targeted area irrespective of whether the workers live in the targeted area. Almost 55% of the 24 work-based employment estimates are positive meaning that schemes bring jobs to targeted areas. For schemes with a local hiring requirement, 75% of work-based employment estimates are positive in contrast to only 33% for schemes without a local hiring requirement.

Table 1. Work-based employment

Local Hiring Requirement?		Negative	No effect	Positive	Mixed	Total
No	Count	1	2	4	5	12
	%	8	17	33	42	100
Yes	Count	0	1	9	2	12
	%	0	8	75	17	100
Total	Count	1	3	13	7	24
	%	4	13	54	29	100

ABIs can increase the number of local residents in employment, but effects are not always positive.

Table 2 focuses on studies that analyse residence-based employment or unemployment. Residence-based employment refers to employment or unemployment rates for residents currently living in the targeted area. It seems that local hiring requirements do not play a crucial role regarding employment opportunities for residents living in the targeted area. A little under 55% of 24 residence-based estimates are positive meaning that schemes bring jobs to people that live in targeted areas. However, local hiring requirements do not seem to affect the likelihood that a business-focussed ABI will bring jobs to people that live in targeted areas.

Table 2. Residence-based employment or unemployment

Local Hiring Requirement?		Negative	No effect	Positive	Mixed	Total
No	Count	0	3	6	2	11
	%	0	27	55	18	100
Yes	Count	0	2	7	4	13
	%	0	15	54	31	100
Total	Count	0	5	13	6	24
	%	0	21	54	25	100

The evidence is mixed on whether ABIs improve the employment outcomes of existing residents.

Table 3 summarises outcomes for the small number of studies that directly consider employment outcomes for existing residents. Most of these studies consider schemes that involve local hiring requirements. Two out of five of these studies report a positive effect on employment outcomes for residents.

Table 3. Employment outcomes for residents

Local Hiring Requirement?		Negative	No effect	Positive	Mixed	Total
No	Count	1	1	0	0	2
Yes	Count	1	1	2	1	5
Total	Count	2	2	2	1	7

ABIs with local hiring requirements are slightly more likely to generate positive wage effects.

Table 4 summarises outcomes for the small number of studies that assess the impact on wages of residents. Only one of four studies report a positive effect on wages for ABIs with no local hiring requirement, in contrast to four out of eight for ABIs with a local hiring requirement.

Table 4. Wages

Local Hiring Requirement?		Negative	No effect	Positive	Mixed	Total
No	Count	0	3	1	0	4
Yes	Count	0	3	4	1	8
Total	Count	0	6	5	1	12

ABIs with local hiring requirements are slightly more likely to generate positive house price effects.

Table 5 summarises outcomes for the small number of studies that consider the impact on house prices. The four studies that consider the impact of ABIs with local hiring requirements all report positive house price effects. In contrast, neither of the two studies that looked at schemes without local hiring requirements reported positive effects.

Table 5. House prices/rents

Local Hiring Requirement?		Negative	No effect	Positive	Mixed	Total
No	Count	0	2	0	0	2
Yes	Count	0	0	4	0	4
Total	Count	0	2	4	0	6

Studies that specifically consider the effect of local hiring requirements on local hiring

Study 1260 (SMS 3) looks at the impact for French ZFUs of changing the requirement for firms to employ local people from 20% (1997 until 2001) to 33% of their employees in 2002. The study looks at the impact on unemployment rates and social composition of targeted areas using data from the French Labour Force Survey for the period 1993 to 2011. The policy started in 1997. Based on previous programmes, as well as the share of the housing stock in poor conditions and the job-to-resident ratio, the government established a set of 416 deprived zones (the ZRU). Among the ZRUs zones, the 44 most deprived zones were designated as ZFU which received the treatment first. The study uses a difference-in-difference approach that compares the outcome of residents living in designated areas (the ZFUs) with the rest of the non-treated areas from the pool of ZRUs. The study finds that the effect on employment moves from insignificant before 2002, to significantly positive in 2002 (a 7.4 percentage point reduction in unemployment, from roughly 30% before the start of the program). However, in 1999 (the only year for which data is available) only 25% of these jobs are taken by residents. The paper provides some evidence of displacement. To analyse the effectiveness of hiring requirements, the study looks at long-term contracts since only open-ended contracts and fixed-term contracts of more than 12 months are eligible for tax exemption. It finds a positive, but insignificant effect of the program on long-term contracts shares among the 15-65 year-old population. The study also considers whether the programme induces changes in the composition of designated areas. Results show that the program increases the age and the level of education among the targeted zones. Consistent with this, data on recent movers suggest more educated and older individuals seem to be moving into the target zone within the same municipality. Results on unemployment are no longer significant when controlling for these individual characteristics.

Study 1258 (SMS 4) examines the effect of Round I of the federal urban Empowerment Zone (EZ) programme – one of the largest place-based policies in the United States which started in 1994 – on employment (work and residence based), wages of residents, and house prices and rents. The programme provided wage credits (up to 20% for the first \$15,000 earned) for each employee living in designated areas and block grants to be used on services (i.e. business advice). The study uses a difference-in-difference strategy, combined with matching techniques, using rejected and future applicants to the EZ program as controls. They use establishment-level data from the Longitudinal Business Database (1987-2002) and from the Decennial Census (1980, 1990, and 2000). Although the paper finds substantial (12 to 21 percent) increases in total employment, there are no detectable effects on wages (only 10 percent of zone workers are zone residents). The study uses confidential census microdata to break down impacts by place of residence and place of work. They find that jobs increase 12 to 19 percent in the targeted area; jobs held by zone residents increase 15 to 18 percent, jobs held increase 6 to 16 percent. They also find that the weekly wages paid to zone residents working inside the zone increase significantly (by approx. 8 to 13 percent). Finally, the study finds that house value increases considerably (around 30%) while rents do not increase.

Study 1251 (SMS 3) examines the impact of the US Empowerment Zone (EZ) and Renewal Community (RC) Round II (in 1998) and III (in 2002) on local labour markets. The programme provides wage credits (\$1,500 in RC and \$3,000 in EZ) to firms for each employee living in designated areas. The study uses a difference-in-difference strategy which compares firms in designated zip codes with a set of non-treated and matched zip codes defined using propensity score matching. The study does not include nearest neighbours as control zip codes to avoid estimation problems arising from spillovers. The study uses

administrative corporate tax return data (from 2000 to 2004) to identify firms that claim for tax credits and administrative individual tax return data with zip code identifiers of the place of residence to construct labour market outcomes. The study demonstrates the importance of differentiating between the local labour impact of a place-based tax incentive and whether firms utilise the tax incentive to employ residents. The study finds modest evidence that zone designation improves local labour market outcomes. While zone designation is estimated to increase total wage by 7.5% for RC residents and 12% for EZ residents, designation does not significantly impact the number of EZRC zone residents who are employed.

Study 0001 (SMS 4) analyses the effect of Enterprise Zones (EZ) in Texas in 2003 on resident employment and home values. The programme offered tax benefits (among other incentives) to businesses located in a designated area whenever at least 25% of its new employees belonged to economically disadvantaged groups or lived in the EZ. The requirement was more stringent (at least 35% of its new employees) for business located outside an EZ. The study uses a regression discontinuity design exploiting the fact that Texan EZs are determined in part by a cut-off rule based on census block group poverty rates. Using Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data (for the period 2002-2009) the study finds that EZ designation has a positive effect on resident employment, increasing opportunities mainly in lower-paying industries. The average annual difference in log resident employment is around 1-2 percent greater in areas just qualifying as EZs relative to similar areas that only just fail to qualify. The estimates imply an increase on average of 5-6 resident jobs per designated block group per year or about 35-42 resident jobs over the time horizon under consideration. However, while some Enterprise Projects contribute directly to job creation in EZs, many contribute to job creation elsewhere (including in nearby non-EZ block groups). As a result, job creation spurred by the program is more geographically diffused than increases in resident job-holding, and the results are not definitive as to whether EZ status is associated with higher workplace employment.

Study 0002 (SMS 4) evaluates the impact on local unemployment of an enterprise zone policy implemented in France in the 1990s. The programme provided tax exemption to firms located in designated areas providing at least 20% of their employees lived in the targeted area. The study uses data from the National Agency for Employment for the 148 Parisian municipalities for the period 1993-2003 (which have on average twice the population of the EZ they contain). The study focuses on three outcomes: unemployment exit to a job, exit from unemployment (for unknown reasons), and entry into unemployment. The study uses three evaluation methods: standard difference-in-differences, synthetic control, and interactive fixed effects. It finds a small positive and significant treatment effect on exits to jobs using an interactive effect method in line with difference-in-difference results. In case of the synthetic control, the estimate is negative but not statistically significant. The study only finds an increase in exit rate for unknown reasons using the synthetic control method. Finally, the three methods find no effects on the entry rate to unemployment.

Study 1220 (SMS 3) evaluates the impact of Round I of the US federal urban Empowerment Zone (EZ) program on neighbourhood level labour markets over the period 1994-2000. As explained for Study 1258, the programme provided wage credits (up to 20% for the first \$15,000 earned) for each employee living in designated areas and block grants to be used on services (i.e. business advice). The study uses a difference-in-difference strategy which compares areas designated to EZ with rejected and future applicants to the EZ program. Since treated and non-treated areas are unbalanced on pre-treatment observable characteristics, the study combines difference-in-difference with propensity

score matching. Using four decades of census data the study finds that neighbourhoods receiving EZ designation experienced substantial improvements in labour outcomes of zone residents. These effects were accompanied by small changes in the demographic composition of the neighbourhoods, but the study provides evidence that the local labour effects are unlikely to have resulted from these demographic changes alone. Given the high rates of turnover in EZ neighbourhoods, it is unclear whether the benefits of EZ designation were captured by pre-existing residents or new arrivals with similar demographic characteristics.

Study 1257 (SMS 3) analyses the effect of the second round of the French enterprise programme (Zones Franches Urbaines, ZFUG2) created in 2004 on work and residence-based jobs and local wages. The local hiring requirements and means of designating zones are explained for study 1260 (above). The study uses a difference-in-difference approach which compares areas designated to the second round of ZFU with areas belonging to the ZRU (excluding the first round ZFUs). The study uses establishment-level data from the French National Institute of Economics and Statistics (focusing on the period 2002-2006) which does not exactly match with EZ boundaries and defines an area as 'treated' if more than 50% of its area is within the EZ. The study also uses administrative data (from payroll taxes) on employment and wages. The study finds an overall positive effect of designation on the number of establishments, which is driven more by relocations than by new firm births. The average impact is an additional 8.5 percent in the growth rate of establishment inflows in comparison with the control group. There is also an increase in the number of jobs (8.5 percent), but no significant effect on worked hours and wages. The study finds heterogeneous effects depending on the level of isolation (or integration) of the treated area, measured using indicators of transportation accessibility and centrality. ZFU created more jobs in spatially integrated neighbourhoods, but only affected local wages in more isolated treated areas.

Study 1225 (SMS 4) measures the impact of US State Enterprise Zones (ENTZs), Federal Empowerment Zones (EMPZs), and Federal Enterprise Community (ENTC) programs created in the 1980s and in the 1990s on local labour markets. Most programmes targeted benefits to the most deprived areas within states and required the hiring of employees from local labour markets. However, tax benefits and business requirement of these programmes vary across states. The study uses a triple difference approach (difference-in-difference-in-differences) which compares changes in employment pre-intervention with changes in employment post-intervention between a set of treated tracts and the nearest and contiguous (based on distance) non-treated census tracts. The study uses census data (1980, 1990, and 2000) at the tract level and looks at unemployment, poverty rate, and wages. The study finds evidence that ENTZ designation significantly reduces unemployment by 1.6%, poverty rate by 6.1%, increases employment by about 69 people. Estimated effects on wage and salary income are insignificant. EMPZ designation significantly reduces tract unemployment by about 8.7%, poverty rate by about 8.8%, and significantly raises average wage and salary income by about \$6000 (but effects on the fraction with positive wages and salary income are insignificant). ENTC designation lowers the unemployment rate by about 2.6 percentage points, the poverty rate by approximately 20 percentage points, raises the fraction with positive employment earnings by 1.36 percentage points, and average wage and salary income by \$3209. In summary, the study finds that these programmes significantly improve the labour market on every measure except the fraction with wage and salary income (except for ENTC designation which significantly improves all five labour market measures).

Annex 2: Findings on employment outcomes and price effects by local hiring

Table A1 shows the distribution of studies in terms of the sign of the effects on labour market outcomes, house prices, and wages, split by whether or not the scheme imposed a local hiring condition. As previously described, work-based employment refers to the number of jobs created in the targeted area irrespective of whether the workers live in the targeted area. Residence-based employment refers to employment or unemployment rates for residents currently living in the targeted area.

Table A1. Findings by outcome and local hiring condition

Local Hiring Requirement?	Total Evaluated	Negative	No effect	Positive	Mixed
Outcome: Work-based employment					
No	12	0011	1286, 1217	1314, 0012, 1288, 1317	0008, 1232, 1255, 1265, 0006
Yes	12		1313	1225, 1264, 1251, 1258, 0001, 1257, 1262, 1263, 1289	1248, 1267
Outcome: Residence-based employment or unemployment					
No	11		0004, 1234, 1235	1317, 1314, 0012, 0006, 0010, 0003	0008, 0013
Yes	13		1236, 1290	1225, 1264, 1258, 0001, 1220, 1238, 0007	1260, 0002, 0005, 1245
Outcome: Employment outcomes for residents					
No	2	1286	0004		
Yes	5	1251	1313	1258, 0001	1257
Outcome: Wages					
No	4		1317, 1232, 1234	0003	
Yes	8		1313, 1220, 1236	1225, 1258, 1238, 1285	1251
Outcome: House prices/Rents					
No	2		1317, 1234		
Yes	4			0001, 1220, 1285, 1290	

Annex 3: Evidence Reviewed

The table below provides details of the evaluation evidence covered in this toolkit. Evaluations with a study number beginning with 1 appear in our original ABI review, evaluations with a study number beginning with 0 are new studies (SMS2 and above) identified for this toolkit. These studies were not included in the original review because they were SMS 2 (9 studies), published after the searches for our original review (one study), SMS3 and SMS4 studies not identified as part of our original search process (two and one studies, respectively).

Study number	SMS	Reference
1260	3	Charnoz, P. (2015). Do place-based policies help people? Evidence from French enterprise zones. CREST Working Paper.
1258	4	Busso, M., Gregory, J., & Kline, P. (2013). Assessing the incidence and efficiency of a prominent place based policy. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 103(2), 897–947.
1251	3	Tong, P. (2014). The Impact of Place-Based Employment Tax Credits on Local Labor : Evidence from Tax Data. University of Alberta Working Paper No. 2014-06
1264	3	Gobillon, L, Magnac, T and Selod, H (2012). Do Unemployed Workers Benefit from Enterprise Zones? The French Experience. IZA Discussion Paper 6357.
0001	4	Freedman, M. (2013). Targeted Business Incentives and Local Labor Markets. <i>Journal of Human Resources</i> , 48(2), 311–344.
0002	4	Gobillon, L., & Magnac, T. (2016). Regional Policy Evaluation: Interactive Fixed Effects and Synthetic Controls. <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i> , 98(2), 209–225.
1220	3	Busso, M., & Kline, P. (2008). Do Local Economic Development Programs Work ? Evidence from the Federal Empowerment Zone Program □. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1638, (February), 59.
1257	3	Briant, A., Lafourcade, M., & Schmutz, B. (2015). Can tax breaks beat geography? Lessons from the french enterprise zone experience. <i>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</i> , 7(2), 88–124.
1225	4	Ham, J. C., Swenson, C., Imrohrorlu, A., & Song, H. (2011). Government programs can improve local labor markets: Evidence from State Enterprise Zones, Federal Empowerment Zones and Federal Enterprise Community. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 95(7–8), 779–797
1313	4	Behaghel, L., Lorenceau, A., & Quantin, S. (2015). Replacing churches and mason lodges? Tax exemptions and rural development. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 125, 1–15.
1255	4	Billings, S. (2007). Do Enterprise Zones Work ? An analysis at the borders. Working Paper No. 07-09 Center for Economic Analysis Colorado.
1288	3	Bondonio, D. (2002). Evaluating Decentralized Policies: A Method to Compare the Performance of Economic Development Programmes Across Different Regions or States. <i>Evaluation</i> . 8(1), 101- 124.
1217	3	Bondonio, D., & Engberg, J. (2000). Enterprise zones and local employment: evidence from the states' programs. <i>Regional Science and Urban Economics</i> , 30, 519–549.
0003	3	Couch, J. F., Atkinson, K. E., & Smith, L. H. (2005). The Impact of Enterprise Zones on Job Creation in Mississippi. <i>Contemporart Economic Policy</i> . Vol.23. No.2, April 2005, 225-260
1314	4	Criscuolo, C., Martin, R., Overman, H. G., & Reenen, J. Van. (2016). Some causal Effects of An Industrial Policy. CEP Discussion Paper 1113.
1298	3	Devereux, M. P., Griffith, R., & Simpson, H. (2007). Firm location decisions, regional grants and agglomeration externalities. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 91, 413–435.
0004	3	Elvery, J. A. (2009). The Impact of Enterprise Zones on Resident Employment An Evaluation of the Enterprise Zone Programs of California and Florida. <i>Economic Development Quarterly</i> , 23(1), 44–59.

1317	4	Freedman, M. (2012). Teaching new markets old tricks : The effects of subsidized investment on low-income neighborhoods. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 96(11–12), 1000–1014.
1286	4	Freedman, M. (2015). Place-based programs and the geographic dispersion of employment □. <i>Regional Science and Urban Economics</i> .
1263	3	Givord, P., Rathelot, R., & Sillard, P. (2013). Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects : An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program □. <i>Regional Science and Urban Economics</i> , 43(1), 151–163.
1262	4	Givord, P., Quantin, S., & Trevien, C. (2012). A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones. <i>Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques Working Paper 2012/01</i> .
0005	2	Greenbaum, R. T., & Bondonio, D. (2004). Losing Focus: A Comparative Evaluation of Spatially Targeted Economic Revitalization Programmes in the US and the EU. <i>Regional Studies</i> , 38(3), 319–334.
1265	3	Greenbaum, R. T., & Engberg, J. B. (2004). The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban Manufacturing Establishments, 23(2), 315–33
1289	3	Hanson, A., & Rohlin, S. (2013). Do spatially targeted redevelopment programs spillover? <i>Regional Science and Urban Economics</i> , 43(1), 86–100
1267	4	Hanson, A., & Rohlin, S. (2011). The effect of location-based tax incentives on establishment location and employment across industry sectors. <i>Public Finance Review</i> , 39(2), 195–225.
1290	4	Hanson, A. (2009). Local employment, poverty, and property value effects of geographically-targeted tax incentives: An instrumental variables approach.
1301	3	Harris, R., & Robinson, C. (2004). Industrial Policy in Great Britain and Its Effect on Total Factor Productivity in, 51(4), 528–543.
1235	4	Kolko, J. & Neumark, D. (2010). Do enterprise zones create jobs ? Evidence from California ' s enterprise zone program. <i>Journal of Urban Economics</i> , 68(1), 1–19
0006	2	Low, S. A., & Mcnamara, K. T. (2004). The Indiana Enterprise Zone Program: Fiscal Impact of a Job Creation Tax Credit.
1232	3	Lynch, D., & Zax, J. S. (2011). Incidence and Substitution in Enterprise Zone Programs: The Case of Colorado. <i>Public Finance Review</i> , 39(2), 226–255.
1233	3	Mayer, T., Mayneris, F., & Py, L. (2013). The Impact of Urban Enterprise Zones on Establishment Location Decisions: Evidence from French ZFUS. <i>Banque de France Working Paper 458</i> .
1234	3	Montgomery, N. (2010). The Effect of Enterprise Community Designation for Rural Areas. University of Michigan PhD Thesis.
1236	3	Oakley, D., & Tsao, H. (2006). A New Way of Revitalizing Distressed Urban Communities ? Assessing the Impact of the Federal Empowerment Zone Program. <i>Journal of Urban Affairs</i> , 28(5), 443–471.
1238	3	Oakley, D., & Tsao, H.-S. (2007). Socioeconomic gains and spillover effects of geographically targeted initiatives to combat economic distress: An examination of Chicago's Empowerment Zone. <i>Cities</i> . 24(1), 43-59.
0007	2	Oakley, D., & Tsao, H. (2007). The Bottom – Up Mandate : Fostering Community Partnerships and Combating Economic Distress in Chicago's Empowerment Zone. <i>Urban Studies</i> , 44(4), 819–843.
0008	2	Potter, J., & Moore, B. (2000). UK Enterprise Zones and the Attraction of Inward Investment. <i>Urban Studies</i> , 37(8), 1279–1312.
1285	3	Reynolds, C. L., & Rohlin, S. M. (2015). The effects of location-based tax policies on the distribution of household income: Evidence from the federal Empowerment Zone program. <i>Journal of Urban Economics</i> , 88, 1–15.
1245	3	Rich, M. J., & Stoker, R. P. (2010). Rethinking Empowerment: Evidence from Local Empowerment Zone Programs. <i>Urban Affairs Review</i> . 45(6), 775-796.

1248	3	Smith, R. (2015). Empowerment for whom? The impact of community renewal tax incentives on jobs and businesses. <i>Urban Studies</i> , 52(4), 702–720.
0009	2	Smith, R. (2016). Did the Community Renewal Tax Incentives Pirate Businesses From Other Places? <i>Economic Development Quarterly</i> , 30(1), 46–61.
0010	2	Sridhar, K. S. (2000). Tax Incentive Programs and Unemployment Rate. <i>The Review of Regional Studies</i> , 30(3), 275–298.
0011	2	Sutton, S. (2014). Are BIDs Good for Business? The Impact of BIDs on Neighborhood Retailers in New York City. <i>Journal of Planning Education and Research</i> , 34(3), 309–324.
1306	3	Jones, J. & Wren, C. (2011). Assessing the regional impact of grants on fdi location: Evidence from U.K. Regional policy, 1985-2005. <i>Journal of Regional Science</i> , 51(3), 497–517. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.2010.00708.x
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