



what works centre for
local economic growth

Toolkit Employment Training Neighbourhood Saturation Programmes

What are they are what do they aim to do?

Neighbourhood saturation is a policy model that involves programmes supporting large numbers of residents in a local area. By providing intense support focussed on one area, saturation aims to achieve greater impact by creating a 'critical mass' of successful residents to teach, inspire, or otherwise influence others in the community. By encouraging positive spillovers between residents, saturation aims for transformational change of deprived neighbourhoods. To strengthen these spillover effects, saturation policies typically also involve 'community support for work' (i.e. community building and strengthening peer relationships) in addition to more direct support.

Although neighbourhood saturation programmes can target all residents and many different outcomes, this toolkit focusses on programmes that aim to improve employment outcomes by targeting all out of work residents in a community. Employment support saturation programmes often feature a combination of financial incentives for job-seekers or employers, childcare interventions, job training, neighbourhood support for finding work, and mentorship, in addition to the community measures mentioned above.

Things to consider

- Is saturation a cost-effective approach for increasing local employment or earnings?** The four studies found little measurable impact on overall employment or earnings, although findings are more positive for specific groups within target areas. That said, costs usually exceed benefits for specific groups where measurable impacts are positive. Evidence from the New Deal for Communities (NDC) suggests that programmes aimed at social welfare do no better on employment or earnings. Taken together, **these findings cast some doubt on the cost-effectiveness of supporting all unemployed residents, as opposed to more targeted programmes within areas.**
- How can area-level gains be increased?** Some evidence suggests that low levels of residential mobility are associated with larger area-level improvements. That is, individual benefits translate into area level benefits, provided those individuals don't move out.
- Are there area characteristics that change effectiveness?** Saturation may work best for individuals that belong to highly concentrated minority ethnic groups (and within these communities women may fare much better than men). This may reflect greater spillovers within tight-knit communities and suggests that saturation may be more effective when combined with community building measures.
- Are there individual characteristics that change effectiveness?** One UK study finds that financial incentives and careers advice are more effective for individuals with high subjective employability (e.g. motivation) but low objective employability (e.g. qualifications).
- What are the potential wider impacts of neighbourhood saturation programmes?** There may be wider 'non-economic' benefits to saturation programmes, even if programmes focus on outcomes such as resident employment and earnings. For NDC, a multi-objective programme, evaluation evidence shows mixed results on outcomes such as crime, health, satisfaction with housing and neighbourhood satisfaction. Overall, however, the evidence does not provide sufficient information to allow us to reach strong conclusions on the additional benefits of neighbourhood saturation programmes that target economic outcomes.

How effective are they?

Evidence on employment effects is mixed: some groups in a community may benefit more than others. Only one of four studies finds positive effects on overall employment outcomes. However, two of the three studies that do not find positive effects overall, do find them for certain groups:

- For one US programme, positive effects were found for the largest ethnic groups on each site (often comprising a very high percentage of neighbourhood residents); furthermore, within these communities there were significant differences in outcomes by gender.
- For one UK programme (Employment Zones) there were positive effects for individuals rated as less employable on objective measures (e.g. skills, experience) and/or on subjective measures (e.g. attitudes, motivation) but *negative* effects for individuals rated highly on both of these measures. The study also reports positive effects for 30-49 year-olds (the oldest in the study), but no effect for other age groups.

Evidence for positive earnings effects is slightly stronger than for employment, and these also vary across groups. Two of three studies (both on the same US programme) find positive earnings effects overall. As with employment, earnings effects vary across groups, with larger effects for those

not receiving government benefits or with poor employment history, long-term or younger residents and for the largest ethnic groups on each site. A third UK study (StepUP) finds no measurable impact on earnings, either overall or for specific groups. Indeed, for some groups days worked increased with no effect on earnings, suggesting that wages fell for those groups. The most employable individuals even saw earnings fall.

Box 1: Evidence on New Deals for Communities programme

New Deal for Communities (NDC) was a ‘social welfare’ saturation programme implemented in the UK. Social welfare saturation differs from employment programmes because they aim to improve a broad range of additional outcomes such as crime, housing quality, and health. Local NDC programmes were significantly steered by residents, who helped come up with particular initiatives. Initiatives on ‘worklessness’ differed by area, but frequently targeted large numbers of residents in a neighbourhood and were motivated by the idea that spillovers should enhance programme effects.

We found six NDC studies overall. Of the five that evaluate employment outcomes, only one study finds a small positive effect (those supported are 1.01 times more likely to exit unemployment), two find mixed effects, and two find no effect. Three of these studies also examine income, finding no effect. Three studies look at the effect on further training, with one finding a positive effect, one finding no effect overall but a positive effect for highly educated individuals, and one finding no effect.

Four studies examine the effect on different welfare outcomes: findings are mixed. NDC may have led to improved perceptions of crime (two out of three studies) and number of crimes experienced (one study finds a decrease, another no effect). NDC has no positive effects on the adoption of healthy habits (e.g. exercise, eating fruit and veg, not smoking), self-reported health or perceived quality of local health services. It has a positive impact on neighbourhood satisfaction, but no impact on satisfaction with housing.

Is saturation for employment cost effective?

The findings reported in the studies suggest that saturation policies may not be cost effective on either overall employment or earnings measures, and may be high cost for sub-groups where we see positive impacts. There may also be wider benefits to saturation programmes that have broader objectives, but the studies do not allow us to reach strong conclusions on those additional benefits or programme cost-effectiveness in achieving them.

For the US Jobs-Plus scheme, a reported cost of £500 per household per year is combined with estimates of effects on earnings to produce a cost-effectiveness figure: Jobs-Plus increases earnings by 80p for every pound spent on the programme. This is not cost effective, and is likely to be an upper bound since the cost figure ignores financial incentives which were provided as part of the evaluated programme.

For the UK StepUP scheme, the study reports a programme cost of £9,300 per participant per year. For many groups the programme had no effect on employment so was not cost-effective. Even for those groups where effects were positive, the costs per extra working day were high (£218 for 30-49 year olds, £142 for a low employability group), especially given that the average participant earned only £53.36 per day. Further, there were no positive earnings effects, suggesting that additional working days came at the cost of lower wages, so the programme was not cost effective on this measure for any group.

Annex: Evidence on employment saturation policies

How secure is the evidence?

This toolkit summarises the available ex-post evaluations of the effect of saturation programmes for employment (i.e. quantitative studies that test the impact of the programme). This toolkit does not consider process evaluations, or evidence based on qualitative or case study methods. Instead, we focus on impact evaluations that identify effects that can be attributed, with some degree of certainty, to the support provided.

We looked for evidence on the effect of employment saturation policies on employment and earnings. We focused on evidence from the OECD, in English. We considered any study that provided before-and-after comparisons or cross-sectional studies that control for differences between supported and unsupported areas or individuals. We also included more robust studies that compared changes for supported areas or individuals with a control group, or that used a source of randomness in provision of support to estimate a causal effect.¹ In summarising the evidence, we place greater emphasis on studies with stronger methods.

We found four evaluations of saturation programmes for employment that meet our minimum evidence standards. Two of these examine a US programme (Jobs-Plus), and two examine UK programmes (StepUp and Employment Zones). Jobs-Plus was implemented as a randomised controlled trial (RCT) and therefore these two studies represent the highest standard of evidence (SMS 5). The Employment Zones study examines before-and-after changes in outcomes for supported areas against a control group (SMS 3), while the StepUp study examines cross-sectional differences in outcomes for supported individuals against a control group (SMS 2). We found an additional six studies on the New Deal for Communities programme (NDC), discussed in Box 1, that all examine before-and-after changes in outcomes for supported individuals against a control group (SMS 3).

The evidence

Evidence on employment effects is mixed: some groups in a community may benefit more than others.

Study 612 (SMS 5) evaluates the employment impact of the US Jobs-Plus policy. This policy provided all residents of chosen social housing developments with employment-related services, financial incentives for work, and community support for work, from 1998 to 2003. Employment-related services and activities included vocational training, job search assistance, educational programmes, childcare support, and transportation assistance. Financial incentives changed social housing rules to reduce the extent to which earnings increases were offset by rent increases. Finally, community support for work programmes fostered neighbour-to-neighbour exchanges of information related to job search. The programme randomly assigned entire social housing developments to treatment and control groups. The study uses data from housing authority tenant records and state Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records from 1998 to 2003. It considers individual-level outcomes for residents, regardless of whether they remained in the development or not. Taking the outcomes of all sites together, the study finds that Jobs-Plus did not have a statistically significant impact on employment rates. The study also reports findings separately by site, finding that only one of the six sites (Dayton, Ohio) had statistically significant positive employment effects overall. The study also considers heterogeneous effects for different

¹ See the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale for more: <http://www.whatworksgrowth.org/resources/the-scientific-maryland-scale/>

populations for the three sites where the programme was implemented in full.² For these sites, the study finds that the programme tended to have significant effects for the largest ethnic groups on each site (that often comprise a very high percentage of site residents). Thus, the study finds that in Dayton, the programme increased employment by 4.7 percentage points for black non-Hispanic women. In Los Angeles, the programme had no effect on Hispanic women, but increased the employment of Hispanic men by 10.8 percentage points. Finally, in St. Paul, Minnesota, the programme had no effect on Southeast Asian men, but increased the employment of Southeast Asian women by 12.8 percentage points.

Study 620 (SMS 5) evaluates the employment impact of the Jobs-Plus programme implemented in Seattle. As with other Jobs-Plus evaluations, housing sites were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. In contrast to other Jobs-Plus sites, Seattle was distinctive due to the fact that the HOPE VI programme interrupted the intervention. In the midst of Jobs-Plus, this policy tore down the housing development and rebuilt it as a mixed-income neighbourhood (by offering some houses for sale at the market rate). Jobs-Plus started in 1998, while HOPE-VI began its demolitions in 2002. The study uses data from housing authority tenant records and state Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records from 1998 to 2003. It considers individual-level outcomes for residents, regardless of whether they remained in the development or not. The study finds that Job-Plus had no impact on employment, even before the HOPE VI intervention.

Study 618 (SMS 3) evaluates the employment impact of the UK Employment Zone (EZ) programme. The policy was implemented in the year 2000 in fifteen areas across the UK. The programme targeted areas with high concentrations of long-term unemployment, and combined financial incentives (for both employees and local employers) with career assistance. In treated areas, all residents who had been unemployed for at least 12 or 18 months (depending on the area) were referred to the programme. In the first stage of the programme, each participant received support from a personal advisor, who helped them identify barriers to work and develop a 13 week action plan. In the second stage, which lasted until the individual was employed (and up to a maximum of 26 weeks), the participant received an 'EZ subsistence payment'. Employers were also subsidised by an amount of £400 when the resident started work and then a much larger payment of £2,500 after the participant had remained in employment for 13 weeks. Premium payments were made to employers for participants with unemployment durations of more than three years. The study makes use of administrative data on unemployment claims to examine the impact of the programme. It finds that eligible unemployed individuals living in EZ areas transition out of unemployment at a significantly faster rate than unemployed individuals living in similar comparator areas. It finds that the programme did not negatively impact unemployment outflows for non-participants.

Study 616 (SMS 2) evaluates the employment impact of the UK StepUP policy. StepUP was an "intermediate labour market" policy that provided a subsidised job for a year to unemployed residents in 20 distressed neighbourhoods. Individuals who were still unemployed six months after participating in the New Deal programme were offered a StepUP job and were required to take it otherwise they would lose their unemployment benefit – Jobseekers Allowance (JSA). The policy had two phases - the first 26 weeks were called the "retention phase" and aimed to keep the participant in the temporary job. The second phase was aimed at helping the participant find a permanent job. StepUP was implemented in 2002 and ran for two years. The study performs a post-treatment comparison of residents of electoral wards that received the treatment with residents of electoral wards that did not receive the treatment,

2 The other three sites suffered from high turnover in the upper management of the housing authorities, which led to Jobs-Plus staffing problems, as well as the prioritisation of other development programmes. For instance, in Chattanooga, the financial incentives portion of the programme was not implemented, while in Seattle the programme was disrupted by an estate renewal intervention.

but were also on JSA. Interviews were conducted around six months after the end of the StepUp subsidised job period and were used to determine the effect on employment. The study finds that the programme had no significant overall impact on days of employment in the last 90 days (i.e. 90 days prior to the interview therefore not covering any StepUp job days) or probability of being employed in the last 90 days. The study conducts a breakdown of the analysis by three age groups (18-24, 25-29 and 30-49 years old) and by four 'employability' groups that are combinations of objective (i.e. qualifications, experience assessed from CVs) and subjective (i.e. motivation, attitudes assessed by interview) employability. The study finds a significant positive effect (+10.52) on days worked for the 30-49 group but no significant effects for other age groups. The study finds a negative employment effect for individuals with both high objective and high subjective employability and a positive effect for the three remaining combinations (high-low, low-high, and low-low). The study also considers the programme's impact on 18 to 24 year olds by their level of 'initial disadvantage'.³ The study finds no employment effects, apart from a negative effect on employment probability for young people with multiple labour market disadvantages.⁴ The study finds no difference in effects between men and women.

Evidence for positive earnings effects is slightly stronger than for employment, and also vary across groups.

Study 612 (SMS 5) evaluates the wage impact of the US Jobs-Plus policy. The study uses data from housing authority tenant records and state Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records from 1998 to 2003. It considers individual-level outcomes for residents, regardless of whether they remained in the development or not. Across all sites, Jobs-Plus increased wages by 6.2 per cent from 2000 to 2003. This effect increases to 14.1 per cent when only sites with stronger implementation are considered (i.e. those without implementation problems, see above). Two of the weak implementation sites (Baltimore, Maryland and Chattanooga, Tennessee) experienced no impacts, while gains in the other four sites ranged from 4 per cent (Seattle, 1998 cohort) to 19.4 per cent (Dayton, 2000 cohort). The study also performs an analysis by type of individual for the sub-sample of sites where implementation was strongest. It finds that the programme was more effective for individuals who had not received Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF; 17.9% vs. 10.7%), had lived in the social housing project for more than four years (21.2% vs. 8.4%), had been employed for less than three out of the eight previous quarters at the baseline (37.8% vs. 7.2%), were aged 21-24 (22.1%) or 25-34 (14.2%) as opposed to 35-61 (10.7%). The programme's positive impacts were also stronger (than the average) for largest ethnicity-gender subgroups in the sample. In Dayton, black non-Hispanic women increased their earnings by 16.3 per cent (versus 13 per cent average), in LA Hispanic men increased their earnings by 28.3 per cent (versus 14.8 per cent average), and in St. Paul Southeast Asian men and women increased their earnings by 20.6 and 23.4 per cent, respectively (versus 15.4 average). The study also considers whether individual-level gains translated to area-level wage increases. In this case, the study considers the programme impact on residents, so that programme participants who moved away are ignored. The study finds that area-level impacts only occurred in two sites – in LA wages increased by 22.6 per cent, while in St. Paul wages increased by 14.6 per cent, from 2000 to 2003. The study notes that these large area-level effects may be due to the fact that both sites had relatively low rates of resident mobility (between 17 and 27 per cent). It is interesting to note that in LA, area-level impacts exceed individual-level impacts by 40 per cent, which may imply spill over effects. On the other hand, for the Dayton site, which had the highest level of mobility at 48 per cent, area-level level income was only

3 Berthoud's six spheres of "multiple disadvantages in employment" are used. For more information see: <http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/files/313.pdf>

4 Four or more of the following six labour market disadvantage: has no partner, has disability or long-standing illness, is qualified below NVQ level 2, is aged over 50, lives in area of high unemployment, is black and/or minority ethnic.

9% higher and not statistically significant compared with the control site, despite Dayton having large individual effects.

Study 620 (SMS 5) evaluates the earnings impact of the Seattle Jobs-Plus programme. The intervention in this particular site, which started in 1998, was interrupted by HOPE VI estate renewal in 2002. The study uses data from housing authority tenant records and state Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records from 1998 to 2003. It considers individual-level outcomes for residents, regardless of whether they remained in the development or not. The study finds that despite the interruption, from 2000 to 2003, earnings increased by 4 per cent. However, income growth is strongest before HOPE VI, averaging 10.6 per cent from 2000 to 2001.

Study 616 (SMS 2) evaluates the earnings impact of the UK StepUP policy. Interview data is used to determine the effect on earnings measured as the annualised amount received in the 90 days prior to interview. The study considers individual-level outcomes for all individuals in the areas (regardless of whether they actually participated in the programme) as well as for individuals who participated in the programme. The study finds no effect of StepUP on earnings overall, or for any subgroup by age or employability – apart from a negative effect for the most employability individuals, mirroring the negative employment effect for this group. Thus for certain groups, StepUp increased the number of days worked without significantly increasing earnings. The study suggests that this could have occurred because StepUp resulted in participants having lower reservation wages.

Cost effectiveness

The findings reported in the studies suggest that saturation policies may not be cost effective on either overall employment or earnings measures. There may also be wider benefits to saturation programmes that have broader objectives, but the studies do not allow us to reach strong conclusions on those additional benefits or programme cost-effectiveness in achieving them.

Studies 612 and 620 do not include cost effectiveness information for Jobs-Plus, but a report on a subsequent expansion of the programme to San Antonio and the Bronx provides insight into the programme's costs.⁵ The report notes that in San Antonio, the programme cost £412 per household per year.⁶ In the Bronx, the programme cost £551 per household per year. These new sites likely represent lower bounds estimates of the cost, since neither site fully implemented the rent-related financial incentives. As noted in study 620, the programme's average impact across all sites was a £400 increase in annual earnings per household. This would suggest that for every pound spent on Jobs-Plus, residents gained £0.80⁷ in earnings. However, as noted this figure is likely to be an upper bound since the strong implementation sites are likely to have had higher costs. Further, the study finds largely no effects on employment, therefore the programme is not cost-effective on this measure.

Study 616 notes that the StepUP programme cost £9,300 per participant per year. This cost is in line with other Intermediate Labour Market policies, and includes employment wage subsidies, support costs, and other overhead expenses. The programme only had positive effect on days worked for individuals aged 30-49, and those with high objective but low subjective employability. For the 30-49 year olds, the programme increased the number of working days (in the previous 90 days) by 10.52. Assuming the effect did not diminish after the 90 period, this implies that it cost £9,300 to gain 42.7 working days over the subsequent year, or £218 per extra day of work. For the high objective but low subjective employability group, the relevant cost was £142 per extra working day. These are very large costs given that the average participant earned only £53.36 per day of work in the 90 day period. For

5 See: http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/CEO-SIF_Jobs-Plus_2015_FR.pdf.

6 All USD to GBP conversions used the exchange rate for 15/03/2017 as reported by the Financial Times.

7 Dividing wage increases by the average of the costs of the programme in San Antonio and the Bronx.

the other groups there were no effects on days worked therefore the programme was not cost effective on this measure. Further, there were no positive earning effects (despite working more days) therefore on this measure the programme wasn't cost effective for any group.

New Deal for Communities (NDC): evaluation evidence

The UK New Deal for Communities (NDC) aimed to bridge living standards between the 39 most deprived communities and the rest of the country. To this end, each neighbourhood was asked to establish a committee that designed policies to tackle unemployment, high crime incidence, low educational achievement, poor health, and problems with housing and the environment. While each neighbourhood had some discretion in deciding which projects to pursue, they ranged from providing social support (in the form of inclusion programmes and other welfare services), crime interventions (e.g. increasing number of neighbourhood police officers), job-related training, health interventions (e.g. improved sports facilities) and physical regeneration.

Five studies evaluated employment outcomes of NDC.

Study 619 (SMS 3) evaluates the employment impact of the NDC. The study uses the NDC survey – which consists of interviews with NDC residents and matched comparator areas. The baseline NDC survey was conducted in 2002 and there were three follow ups in 2004, 2006 and 2008. Follow-ups contacted initial respondents wherever possible to enable the construction of a panel dataset. This study examines the change over the period 2002-2004, thus using only the baseline and first follow-up survey. The study considers the programme impact on different groups of individuals, according to their employment status at baseline. It finds that for the overall sample, individuals who were employed at baseline, and individuals who were unemployed at baseline, the programme had no impact on employment. On the other hand, for individuals in full-time education at baseline, NDC increased the likelihood of employment by 18 percentage points. For those in employment training at baseline, NDC increased the likelihood of employment by 14 percentage points. The study also finds a positive effect for individuals who report earnings £299 or less per week.

Study 621 (SMS 3) also considers the employment effect of NDC using the NDC survey for 2002, 2004, and 2006 (i.e. before, two and four years after NDC was implemented), and is therefore able to control for time-invariant factors. The treated portion of this dataset includes only residents that remained in NDC areas throughout the six years. The study finds that over 2002 and 2006, NDC had no impact on either transitions to employment or transitions out of unemployment. The study also considers a breakdown in these effects over time. Over the first two years i.e. 2002-2004, there was a significant positive impact on transitions out of unemployment, and no effect on transitions into employment. Over the next two years, both measures were insignificant.

Study 623 (SMS 3) also considers the employment impact of NDC using the NDC survey from 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 (i.e. baseline, and three follow-ups), and is therefore able to control for time-invariant fixed effects. The study finds that living in a NDC area had no effect on whether the individual was employed, or whether the individual belonged to a workless household in follow-up surveys.

Study 624 (SMS 3) also considers the employment impact of NDC using the NDC survey from 2002 and 2004 (i.e. baseline and first follow-up), which allows it to control for time-invariant fixed effects. In this case, the study only considers effects on individuals who were unemployed at baseline. The study finds no effect on employment for the treated group.

Study 625 (SMS 3) evaluates the impact of NDC on benefit claims. It uses the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Dataset, a dataset that tracks all benefit transactions. The study uses information for every year from 1999 (i.e. before the programme was implemented) to 2005, for all benefit claimants in NDC and control areas. This allows the study to control for all time-invariant factors. The study finds that individuals in NDC areas were 1.011 times more likely to go off Jobseeker's Allowance, and 1.16 times more likely to go off Incapacity Benefit or Severe Disability Allowance. However, it is unclear whether these transitions are into a job or into unemployment.

Three of the NDC studies also examine income

Study 619 considers the income impact of NDC using the NDC survey from 2002 and 2004 (i.e. baseline and first follow-up). The study finds that NDC has no effect on annual income.

Study 623 (SMS 3) considers the income impact of NDC using the NDC survey from 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 (i.e. baseline and three follow-ups), and is therefore able to control for time-invariant fixed effects. The study finds that NDC has no effect on whether individual's gross household income was less than £200 per week.

Study 624 (SMS 3) considers the income impact of NDC using the NDC survey from 2002 and 2004 (i.e. baseline and first follow-up), which allows it to control for time-invariant fixed effects. The study finds that the programme had no impact on annual income from paid work.

Three studies look at the effect of NDC on further training

Study 624 (SMS 3) also considers the impact of NDC on training in the UK. It uses the NDC survey from 2002 and 2004 (i.e. before and after the programme), which allows it to control for time-invariant fixed effects. The study finds that the programme had no impact on the overall population's propensity to seek training, but increased a more educated sub-sample's likelihood of seeking training.

Study 621 (SMS 3) also considers the effect of NDC on training in the UK. In particular, it utilises the NDC survey for 2002, 2004, and 2006 (i.e. before, two years after, and four years after the programme was implemented), and is therefore able to control for time-invariant factors. The treated portion of this dataset includes only residents that remained in the NDC areas throughout the six years. The study considers the impact of NDC two years after the baseline, between 2004 and 2006, and four years after the baseline. It finds that for all periods, NDC had no effect on training.

Study 623 (SMS 3) considers the impact of NDC on the likelihood of participating in training or education programmes in the UK. It uses the NDC survey from 2002 (i.e. before the programme), 2004, 2006, and 2008 (i.e. three follow-ups), and is therefore able to control for time-invariant fixed effects. The study finds that NDC increased participation in training.

Four studies examine the effect of NDC on several different welfare outcomes

Study 621 (SMS 3) also considers the effect of NDC on crime, health, and satisfaction. In particular, it utilises the NDC survey for 2002, 2004, and 2006 (i.e. before, two years after, and four years after the programme was implemented), and is therefore able to control for time-invariant factors. The study finds that NDC decreased perceived lawlessness by 4.1 percentage points, increased feelings of safety after dark by 1.2 percentage points, decreased fear of crime by 5.2 percentage points, and decreased the likelihood of having been a victim of at least one crime by 1.8 percentage points. Four

years after baseline, NDC decreased physical activity by 1.9 percentage points, increased smoking by 1.5 percentage points, had no impact on self-rated health, and increased the likelihood of deteriorating health by 3.7 percentage points. The study finds that NDC had no impact on housing satisfaction from 2002 to 2006. Four years after baseline, NDC increased overall neighbourhood satisfaction by 5.5 percentage points, had no effect on residents' willingness but inability to move, decreased residents' desire to move away by 2.3 percentage points, increased perceptions of neighbourhood improvement by 5.1 percentage points, and decreased problems with the environment by 1.8 percentage points.

Study 626 (SMS 3) evaluates the impact of NDC on neighbourhood crime, health, and satisfaction. In contrast to other NDC evaluations, this study recognizes that residents of different NDC zones were exposed to projects with different goals. In this case, it evaluates whether individuals exposed to different types of initiatives experienced changes in exposure to crime. The study uses the NDC from 2002 and 2004, allowing it to control for time-invariant factors. The study considers the impact of different types of initiatives on crime outcomes, namely: crime projects (e.g. CCTV, youth inclusion programmes), neighbourhood wardens (i.e. increased neighbourhood vigilance), and environment projects (e.g. improving leisure facilities). It finds that individuals exposed to crime projects experienced a reduction in fear of crime and perceived lawlessness, but did not see any change in the number of crimes experienced. The same effects are found for individuals exposed to neighbourhood warden initiatives. Environment projects, on the other hand, had no effect on perceived dereliction. The study finds that NDC health initiatives had no impact on any health measures: self-reported mental health, ease of seeing GP, and trust in local health service. The study finds that environment, community, housing, health, education, and employment projects, have no effect on neighbourhood satisfaction. Crime-related projects, on the other hand, have a positive effect on neighbourhood satisfaction.

Study 624 (SMS 3) considers the impact of NDC on crime, health, and satisfaction in the UK. It uses the NDC survey from 2002 and 2004 (i.e. before and after the programme), which allows it to control for time-invariant fixed effects. The study finds that NDC did not have an impact on either fears of crime against the person or fears crime against property. The study finds that NDC had no impact on six self-reported health measures: psychological wellbeing, self-rated health, physical activity, fruit and vegetable consumption, smoking, long-term illness. However, it did decrease age-related decline in self-rated health. The study finds that NDC increased neighbourhood satisfaction.

Study 623 (SMS 3) considers the impact of NDC on health and satisfaction with the neighbourhood and local public services in the UK. It uses the NDC survey from 2002 (i.e. before the programme), 2004, 2006, and 2008 (i.e. three follow-ups), and is therefore able to control for time-invariant fixed effects. The study finds that NDC has no impact on four of the six health variables (extent of exercise, whether the individual smokes, and satisfaction with GP), and a negative impact on the remaining two (perceptions of own health, deterioration in health). The study finds that NDC has no impact on four of the five neighborhood satisfaction variables (extent to which individual wants to move away but can't, overall satisfaction, extent to which individual wants to move, and problems with the environment), but had a positive impact on perceptions of area-level improvements. The study finds that NDC has no impact on housing satisfaction.

Annex: Evidence Reviewed

Ref No. Reference

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This work is published by the What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, which is funded by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Transport. The support of the Funders is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the Centre and do not represent the views of the Funders.

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